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LANGUAGES OF FREEDOM IN DECOLONIZING AFRICA 
By Emma Hunter 
The Gladstone Prize Winner 
 
ABSTRACT. The 'triumph of liberalism' in the mid twentieth-century West is well-known and much 
studied. But what has it meant for the way the decolonization of Africa has been viewed, both at the 
time and since? In this article, I suggest that it has quietly but effectively shaped our understanding of 
African political thinking in the 1950s–1960s. Although the nationalist framing that once led 
historians to neglect those aspects of the political thinking of the period which did not move in the 
direction of a territorial nation-state has now been challenged, we still struggle with those aspects of 
political thinking that were, for instance, suspicious of a focus on the individual and profoundly 
opposed to egalitarian visions of a post-colonial future. I argue that to understand better the history of 
decolonization in the African continent, both before and after independence, while also enabling 
comparative work with other times and places, we need to think more carefully and sensitively about 
how freedom and equality were understood and argued over in local contexts. 
 
 
Gabriel Ruhumbika’s 1969 novel Village in Uhuru tells the story of the rise of Tanzania’s nationalist 
movement and the rocky first years after independence in 1961, as seen from the perspective of an 
island community living far from the capital Dar es Salaam. A striking moment in the novel comes 
when, in 1962, two Government Ministers visit the island to celebrate Saba Saba Day, a public 
holiday commemorating the founding of the nationalist party TANU. They hold a public meeting at 
which, Ruhumbika writes, they ‘explained democracy, and the important Bill their Government had 
passed in conformity with its resolution and promise to democratise society, the Chiefs’ Bill.’1 The 
lesson that those who attended the meeting came away with was simple. It was that ‘their mtemi 
[chief] was no longer mtemi. Even if he were to come back they were no longer supposed to send him 
                                                     
1 Gabriel Ruhumbika, Village in Uhuru (Harlow, 1969), 93. 
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the traditional presents.’ In this time of uhuru [independence], ‘all people were equal. Their mtemi 
had become an ordinary person like themselves.’2 
What are we to make of this encounter? On the face of it, the answer is simple. It is a familiar 
attempt by a modernizing nationalist party in early post-colonial Africa to confront and to overcome 
the forces of tradition. In Ruhumbika’s dramatic telling, we see party officials seeking to educate the 
citizens of the new state, to enable them to seize their new-found freedom with both hands and to 
discard old hierarchies. This was the moment when age-old tradition was swept away by the forces of 
progress and freedom: when the promises and dreams of independence were finally made a reality at 
the local level. 
Ruhumbika’s account is of course fictional, but encounters of this kind certainly did take 
place in African states as they gained independence and began building post-colonial states. And they 
rest at the heart of how historians generally assess the remarkable transformation of Africa in the mid 
twentieth century, as it moved from a continent of empires to a continent of independent nation-states. 
At the moment of independence, nationalist parties in Africa typically rejected what they saw as 
outdated theories of society, defined by hierarchical bonds, in favour of a language of equality and of 
individual freedoms. In this sense, Ruhumbika’s novel, and Africa’s history more widely, seems to fit 
neatly into a global history of the twentieth century, in which the century’s middle decades are 
defined by a ‘triumph of liberalism’ as a ‘politico-intellectual tradition centred on individual freedom 
in the context of constitutional government’.3  
If the basic outline of this transformation is not in doubt, in recent years the historiography of 
decolonization in Africa has been dramatically rewritten. That historiography was once comfortably 
located within a nationalist framework which both took for granted that the outcome of postwar 
nationalist struggles would be a continent of nation-states, and tended to write the history of African 
independence from the perspective of the nationalist parties that eventually won power. In contrast, 
new work, much of it inspired by Frederick Cooper’s analysis, has gone a long way towards re-
                                                     
2 Ruhumbika, Village in Uhuru, 94. 
3 Duncan Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire (Princeton, 2016). 
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opening the sense of possibility which marked this period, and the many roads not taken.4 The 1940s 
and 1950s are now understood to have been characterised by, in Cooper’s terms, both ‘possibility and 
constraint’.5 Although a continent of nation-states came to be seen as inevitable, this future was not 
obvious to all in 1945. 
At the same time, this new body of scholarship has reminded us that the thinking of the 
nationalist parties which took power at independence was itself only one aspect of a much broader 
spectrum of political thinking. Nationalist parties did not instantly capture the support of entire 
populations. Rather, they came to power as the result of a struggle which saw them marginalise 
alternatives. Some of those alternatives were based on political philosophies that would have been 
instantly recognisable to the nationalist parties which eventually triumphed, even if they disagreed on 
questions of emphasis.6 But other people put forward sets of ideas that were more challenging to those 
principles. Some were suspicious of the focus on individual rights which characterised nationalist 
movements, and profoundly opposed egalitarian visions of a post-colonial future.7  
While this latter group have increasingly attracted the attention of historians, they continue to 
fit uneasily into narratives of mid-twentieth-century Africa. They are sometimes described as 
conservatives, sometimes as ethnic patriots.8 They were often older men, and the vision of society 
they promoted was a hierarchical and patriarchal one. The idioms which they used to make claims to 
power and influence are often unfamiliar. Yet the root concerns they had about society and the risks to 
it were often shared by nationalist parties, even if the remedies proposed were very different.  
 
                                                     
4 David Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge, 2012); Frederick 
Cooper, Africa since 1940: the past of the present (Cambridge, 2002). 
5 Frederick Cooper, ‘Possibility and Constraint: African independence in historical perspective’, 
Journal of African History 49, 2 (2008), 167–196. 
6 Giacomo Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: a biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula 
(New York, 2010). 
7 Harri Englund has called on scholars to ask ‘harder questions about the place that the liberal values 
of equality and freedom might have both among the instances being studied and in scholars’ own 
commitments’. Harri Englund, ‘Zambia at 50: The Rediscovery of Liberalism’, Africa: The Journal of 
the International African Institute, 83, 4 (2013), 670–689, at 685.  
8 Derek Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: a history of dissent c. 1935–1972 
(Cambridge, 2012); Miles Larmer, Rethinking African Politics: a history of opposition in Zambia 
(Farnham, 2011), 4. 
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Early histories of the political thought of decolonization in Africa were shaped by 
assumptions about the naturalness of nation-states which many historians shared with the subjects of 
their research. It is largely because historians have learned not to accept nation-states as natural and to 
shed the nationalist assumptions of an earlier generation that the last two decades have seen a radical 
rewriting of the history of decolonization in Africa, as elsewhere. But moving outside nationalist 
frameworks has only taken us so far. It has led to a renewed recognition that there were other 
possibilities in 1945 beyond the territorial nation-states and nationalist regimes which eventually 
triumphed.9 But it remains hard to see where the growing power of a conservative vision of society 
after independence came from. It makes it hard too, as the anthropologist Harri Englund has recently 
observed, to identify ways in which the exercise of power beyond agreed limits continued to be 
challenged even as political space was tightly constrained after independence, sometimes in 
unexpected ways.10  
In this article, I want to suggest that to move the historiography of the decolonization era 
forward, we need to go beyond simply provincializing nationalism. The first generation of scholars 
who wrote about nationalism in Africa certainly often did so within a nationalist framework. Yet, I 
would suggest, their vision was also shaped by the unspoken assumptions of a distinctively mid-
twentieth-century liberalism. While we no longer view the political thought of the time through the 
prism of nationalism, we perhaps still have a tendency to view it through the prism of mid-twentieth-
century liberalism, and therefore tacitly to privilege some voices above others. This means that while 
we understand the political thinking of decolonization to have been concerned with ‘freedom’, we 
have not fully appreciated the diversity of thinking about what freedom meant to contemporaries. I 
would like to explore what happens if we historicize mid-twentieth-century liberalism and set the 
diverse political thinking of mid-twentieth century Africa more firmly in its contemporary context.  
 
                                                     
9 Summarising a body of new research in this vein, Harri Englund has described a ‘rediscovery of 
liberalism’ among historians. Englund, ‘Zambia at 50’. Though the extent to which other options were 
realistic possibilities is increasingly being questioned. Samuel Moyn, ‘Fantasies of Federalism’, 
Dissent, 62, 1 (2015), 145–151.  
10 Englund, ‘Zambia at 50’.  
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To do so, I start by considering the ways in which mid-twentieth-century liberalism has 
shaped the scholarship of the history of decolonization in Africa, and what it might mean to 
historicize it. I then turn to explore evidence from colonial Tanganyika in eastern Africa, which 
suggests that we can identify two broad families of political thinking in the 1950s, one making claims 
for equality and individual rights, the other making claims in idioms which explicitly recognised 
hierarchies. Putting both clearly into the same analytical framework helps us more effectively set the 
era of independence in context and, by allowing us to identify neglected continuities across the 
conventional dividing line of independence, helps us make better sense of post-colonial trajectories.  
 
 
I  Liberalism in context 
 
When historians in the early twenty-first century looked back at the 1950s and 1960s, they were 
struck by the way in which it had become axiomatic that the basic building blocks of international 
society were nation-states.11 Empires, which just a few decades before had dominated the globe, had 
been swept away, and came to be understood as an outdated and illegitimate form of political 
organisation. As Rupert Emerson wrote in 1960 in an evocative phrase which captures this transition, 
‘Empires have fallen on evil days and nations have risen to take their place.’12  
For many people in the continent of Africa, this moment constituted a rejection of European 
domination, and a claim to equal standing in an emerging world order of nation-states. A new and 
powerful body of historical writing, often by scholars who shared the nationalist perspective of their 
subjects, was produced which told of and celebrated the struggles that led to African nationalist 
movements winning independence. But this moment in the history of international thought was not 
characterised only by the assumption that the international political order would and should be based 
on nation-states and not empires. It was also characterised by a set of assumptions about what kind of 
                                                     
11 For example, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the 
Politics of Difference (Princeton, 2010). 
12 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: the rise of self-assertion of Asian and African peoples 
(Cambridge MA, 1960), p. 3. 
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political society should be contained within the building blocks of nations, defined in terms of 
parliamentary democracy, representative government and individual rights.  
These assumptions shaped the politics of the time. In post-colonial Ghana, for example, 
Nkrumah was forced to defend publicly his commitment to parliamentary democracy.13 Those 
leaders, such as Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, who sought to move 
away from two-party systems had to take great care to show why, in their view, multiparty systems 
were inappropriate for their societies.14 This anxiety was, of course, partly a product of the Cold War 
context. But also underlying it was, as the historian of political thought Duncan Bell has recently 
argued, an emerging hegemonic understanding of liberal democracy as the constitutive feature of 
Western modernity. This was, Bell suggests, partly a consequence of a shift in thought which took 
place in the first half of the twentieth century and which saw a remaking of the definition of liberalism 
and a rewriting of the history of the liberal tradition.  
For Bell, this period saw liberalism ‘increasingly figured as the dominant ideology of the 
West—its origins retrojected back into the early modern era, it came to denote virtually all 
nontotalitarian forms of politics as well as a partisan political perspective within societies.’15 It was 
newly ‘yoked’ to democracy, a process which, Bell writes, ‘automatically (and vastly) expanded the 
scope of those purportedly encompassed by liberalism, as supporters of “liberal democracy” were 
conscripted, however reluctantly, to the liberal tradition.’ The consequence was that liberalism was 
‘transfigured from a term identifying a limited and contested position within political discourse to 
either the most authentic expression of the Western tradition or a constitutive feature of the West 
itself.’16 
This mid-twentieth-century triumph of liberalism thereby gradually marginalised those modes 
of thinking which sat outwith liberal traditions. Yet it also marginalised ideas that had once sat more 
                                                     
13 Richard Rathbone, ‘Kwame Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Fate of ‘Natural Rulers’ under 
Nationalist Governments’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 10 (2000), 45–63, p. 57.  
14 Colin Legum, ed., Independence and Beyond: the speeches of Kenneth Kaunda (1966), pp. 208–
209; Julius Nyerere, ‘Democracy and the Party System’ in Julius Nyerere (ed.), Freedom and Unity 
(1966), pp. 195–203.  
15 Bell, Reordering the world, p. 87. 
16 Bell, Reordering the World, p. 87. 
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or less comfortably within a liberal tradition. As Michael Freeden has recently reminded us, rather 
than think in terms of liberalism in the singular, it might historically ‘be more accurate to talk about 
liberalisms in the plural, all part of a broad family exhibiting both similarities and differences. Many 
members of the liberal family overlap in their characteristics, but some are hardly on speaking 
terms.’17 But the mid-twentieth-century moment privileged some aspects of this tradition above 
others. The focus on the individual that characterised newly hegemonic understandings of liberalism 
eclipsed alternative modes of thinking about individual and community, equally embedded in a more 
expansive liberal tradition or traditions. In particular, it obscured the intellectual inheritance of the 
liberal idealism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with its emphasis on individual as 
a member of a community, whose ability to flourish depended on social relationships within that 
community.18 This was a vision of society which, through its adoption of familial metaphors, 
recognised hierarchies within states and in the wider international order.19 It was a way of thinking 
about society which was enormously influential in shaping the political thinking of the colonial 
officials and missionaries who governed Africa in the first half of the twentieth century.20  
The mid-twentieth-century emergence of liberalism as the ‘dominant ideology of the West’, 
in Bell’s terms, had, I would like to suggest, implications for the way that the decolonization of Africa 
was viewed by observers, implications which have continued to influence more recent scholarship. 
Setting the scholarship of the time within its wider intellectual context, it is striking to see the echoes 
of a distinctively mid-twentieth-century set of assumptions about the naturalness of this definition of 
the liberal order. The belief that liberalism defined in these terms offered the best hope for individual 
flourishing under a just government proved a powerful one for those writing about African 
independence, as powerful perhaps as the assumption that Africa was destined to become a continent 
of nation-states.  
                                                     
17 Michael Freeden, Liberalism: A very short introduction (Oxford, 2015), p. 1. 
18 Sandra M. Den Otter, British Idealism and Social Explanation: A Study in late Victorian Thought 
(Oxford, 1996), p. 152. 
19 Jeanne Morefield, Covenants without Swords: Idealist liberalism and the spirit of Empire 
(Princeton, 2005), p. 45. 
20Emma Hunter, ‘Dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens, and the concept of ‘Good Citizenship’ in 
Twentieth-Century Tanzania’, The Historical Journal, 56, 1 (2013), 257–277, p. 259. 
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What this meant was that while a concern with freedom was understood to be central to the 
movements which powered the end of empire in Africa, freedom was understood as inextricably 
bound up with claims of equality. As John Lonsdale wrote in 1981, what had united the first scholars 
of African decolonization, writing in the 1950s and 1960s, was a concern, at once moral and political, 
with freedom. As Lonsdale wrote, this was a definition of freedom ‘based on Africans’ claims for 
political and racial equality’, in which ‘[i]ndividual self-realization, political order, social freedom, 
and equity seemed destined to be joined together under the renewed sovereignties of independent 
Africa.’21  The scholars of the 1950s and 1960s were far less interested in those who rejected this 
focus on the individual, social freedom and equality. Much of that body of thinking took place in the 
idiom of ‘tribe’, and as such seemed to be a backward-looking response to the forces of modernity, 
distant from the liberal tradition.  
After the first flurry of scholarly writing in the 1950s and 1960s, the political arguments of 
Africa in the 1950s slowly slipped into the background of historians’ attention. But this has changed 
dramatically in recent years, and there has been a new flourishing of research on that important 
decade. This growing body of scholarship has revealed two families of thinking present in this 
transitional moment. On the one hand, there were the nationalist movements who advocated a 
transformation in social relationships, breaking down old hierarchies and offering new opportunities 
to the young, women, trade unions and educated elites.22 The political reforms they advocated were 
very familiar in a mid-twentieth-century context. They supported elections and universal suffrage, the 
abolition of chiefship and individual rights. Many were part of transnational networks, linked by 
socialism, organized labour and other elements of an emerging global civil society.23  
 
                                                     
21 John Lonsdale, ‘States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey’, African Studies 
Review, 24, 2/3 (1981), 139–225, p. 143. 
22 Rathbone, ‘Kwame Nkrumah and the Chiefs’. 
23 Recent work is starting to uncover the dynamism of these transnational networks, for example 
Leslie James, George Padmore and Decolonization from Below: Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, and 
the End of Empire (Basingstoke, 2015) and research groups such as Afro-Asian Networks, 
http://afroasiannetworks.com.  
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Yet at the same time, others spoke a very different political language, less recognizable to 
onlookers today. In some contexts, this was a language of chiefship but in other contexts it was the 
chiefs who were the targets of criticism.24 Particularly striking is the explicit recognition of and 
respect for hierarchy, defended sometimes in a language of culture, and at other times in a language of 
tradition.25  
The case of Ghana provides a particularly striking example of this contrast. Perhaps the most 
iconic figure of decolonizing Africa is that of Kwame Nkrumah, who returned from studying in 
America to lead the Gold Coast to self-government in 1951 and then to independence as Ghana in 
1957. Rejecting the gradualist approach of his predecessors, Nkrumah proclaimed that rather than 
wait for economic development, self-government must come first and development would follow 
afterwards. Yet while Nkrumah’s success in binding together a nationalist movement and forcing the 
pace of decolonization captured international imagination, politics at the local level in the 1950s were 
defined by a bruising battle between Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party and local chiefs. These 
chiefs were presented at the time as forces of tradition, destined to be swept aside in modernizing 
Africa. But as Richard Rathbone has shown, the battle was so bruising because of the power of 
chieftaincy, not its weakness. Indeed, what was really at stake was a battle between two contending 
visions: conservative nationalism on the one hand and Nkrumah’s modernizing socialism on the 
other.26  
Nkrumah sought to remake society, and his radical anti-chief language was part of that wider 
project. On one level, then, this was a political battle whereby those with power in the colonial order 
sought to preserve it in the independent Ghana which was being created. But it was also a struggle 
over two different visions of society, in which questions about political relationships were part of a 
wider set of questions about what kind of society could and should be built.  
                                                     
24 Justin Willis, ‘Chieftaincy’, in John Parker and Richard Reid, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Modern African History (Oxford, 2013). Cherry Leonardi and Chris Vaughan, ‘“We are oppressed 
and our only way is to write to higher authority”: The politics of claim and complaint in the 
peripheries of Condominium Sudan’, in Emma Hunter, ed., Citizenship, Belonging and Political 
Community in Africa: Dialogues between Past and Present, (Athens OH, 2016), pp. 74–100. 
25 Derek Peterson, ‘Introduction’ in Derek Peterson, ed., The Politics of Heritage in Africa: 
Economies, Histories, and Infrastructures (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 1–36. 
26 Rathbone, ‘Kwame Nkrumah and the Chiefs’. 
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On the other side of the continent in East Africa, the 1940s and 1950s saw the emergence not 
only of new nationalist movements, but also of new associations, often based on ethnicity, which, in 
Derek Peterson’s words, ‘sought to stitch society together in a hierarchical relationship of trust and 
dependence’.27 Where nationalists were concerned with national self-determination, these groups 
were instead ‘driven by the urgent need to find institutions that could protect civic virtues and define 
honourable conduct.’28 For John Lonsdale, this is the realm of the ‘deep politics’ of ‘moral 
ethnicity’.29 Crucially, this sphere of debate assumed, as Harri Englund writes of modern day Malawi, 
that ‘claims addressing the wealthy and the powerful could be effective precisely when they left 
difference and hierarchy intact.’30 
These groups, or those who wrote in these idioms, are often described as conservatives, but 
they were not simply trying to conserve. They often spoke explicitly about progress and how to 
manage it. They also had a lot to say about freedom – but did not necessarily link freedom with 
equality. What happens if, rather than attaching labels such as ‘conservative’ which fail to do full 
justice to their stated intellectual projects, we take these groups seriously when they say they were 
concerned with freedom, but freedom within society and existing social bonds rather than freedom as 
constituted through individual rights and the rejection of existing hierarchies? In the next section, I 
turn to show how evidence from 1950s Tanganyika might help us to re-read local politics in terms of 
a contrast between two different modes of thinking about freedom.  
 
II 1950s Kilimanjaro 
 
In 1949, a new political movement which called itself the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union was 
created in the district of Moshi in northeastern Tanganyika, on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. At a 
time of rapid political change across the African continent, defined by a language of democratization 
                                                     
27 Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival, pp. 127–128. 
28 Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival, p. 16. 
29 John Lonsdale, ‘KAU’s Cultures’, Journal of African Cultural Studies, 13 (2000), 107–124. 
30 Harri Englund, Human rights and the African airwaves: mediating equality on the Chichewa Radio 
(Bloomington IN, 2011), p. 224. 
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and self-government, this political movement seemed curiously at odds with the trends of the times. 
While its leaders, Petro Njau and Joseph Merinyo, defined their project as defending the rights of 
‘free men’, it was the threat to freedom posed by local chiefs that was the primary focus of their 
attention. They campaigned against a new local government structure which had created three new 
divisional chiefs, and instead called for an elected paramount chief of the Chagga. They demanded 
that clans, not chiefs, be recognized as the true basis of political authority in the district.  Concerned 
that society was under threat from social, political and economic change, they argued for a patriarchal 
vision of society in which older land-holding males fulfilled their duties to the young. 
While these ideas seemed to colonial officials and to many contemporaries to be out of step 
with contemporary developments, they had deep roots in local thinking about hierarchy and the 
location of legitimate social and political power, ideas that had in turn developed in response to the 
social and political change of the 1920s and 1930s. Far from being merely an unthinking hewing to 
tradition, this was a movement born of reflection and of their understanding of the historical past.  
We can see traces of the historical writing which shaped this understanding in a 1950 
document produced by the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union, entitled ‘A history of the customs of 
the Chagga’.31 In it, the Union thanked those scholars, both insiders and outsiders, whose research 
helped provide the basis for their understanding of Chagga history. The person they probably had in 
mind when they wrote of Chagga researchers was a man called Nathaniel Mtui, a Christian convert 
and clerk. Born in 1892, Mtui met an untimely – and violent – death in 1927, but in his relatively 
short life he played a key role in researching and writing the history of the region. Amongst his works 
was a text which has become known as the Nine Notebooks of Chagga History, an English-language 
type-script translation of material originally prepared in the vernacular Chagga language. These 
Notebooks deal most comprehensively with the history of the Chiefdom of Marangu, on the mountain 
of Kilimanjaro. They describe both the earliest chiefs and those in power at the time of writing, 
between 1913 and 1916. In particular, the Notebooks deal with how chiefs came to power, their 
conflicts and the ways in which they lost power.  
                                                     
31 Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union, ‘A History of the Mila ya Wachagga’, Tanzania National 
Archives [hereafter TNA] 5/584, f. 154. 
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Mtui’s Notebooks were produced initially for the Lutheran missionary Bruno Gutmann, a 
German missionary committed to the principle of evangelising through the institutions of society as 
currently constituted. Gutmann combined the role of the missionary with that of the ethnographer, 
because he believed that working through existing social institutions required first understanding 
them. Gutmann came to East Africa in 1902 from Europe, and his reading of Africa’s present and its 
recent past was shaped by his experiences in Europe. He saw European history as characterized by 
corruption and decline. Individualism posed a threat, as he perceived it, to the social bonds that held 
society together, and he feared that this process now spreading to Africa. Gutmann was also working 
in the context of a society under colonial rule, first German and then, after the First World War, 
British government under the supervision of the League of Nations. At the time when he 
commissioned Mtui to carry out this research, Gutmann was preparing to write his long ethnographic 
study, Das Recht der Dschagga, which served in part as a critique of social and political changes 
which he believed were taking place under German rule and in particular the strengthening of the 
power of chiefs, which he believed to rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of Chagga society.32  
Gutmann was particularly interested in the institution of the clan, as we can see from Mtui’s 
text. At one point, Mtui breaks off his narrative to write: ‘I now learn that you [Gutmann] are not 
interested in this material which I have collected about the clans except the notes on the method of 
offering sacrifices by the Nyange clan. You say you want to know about the careers of different clans 
and I can see that this is a job which needs patience and I will have to go into this account gradually. I 
have decided to postpone collecting material about the clans to get to the truth of the whole thing 
about them and how they were affected by the cruelties and richness.’33  
Influenced by the evidence he drew together with the help of informants such as Mtui, 
Gutmann’s conclusion in Das Recht der Dschagga was that the core ties which knit Chagga society 
together were those of the clan. He argued that returning power to the clans would help restore social 
                                                     
32 Emma Hunter, ‘In pursuit of the ‘higher medievalism’: local history and politics in Kilimanjaro’, in 
Derek Peterson and Giacomo Macola, eds., Recasting the Past: History Writing and Political Work in 
Modern Africa (Athens OH, 2009), pp. 149–170. 
33 Nathaniel Mtui, Nine Notebooks of Chagga History, paragraph 160. A microfilm copy of a 1958–59 
English translation is available in Leipzig University Library. 
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harmony and restore the social bonds which he felt were being destroyed by a too rapid transition into 
the modern world. He attempted to translate these prescriptions into practice, for example through the 
establishment of an advisory board of clan heads to promote Christian morality.34 Gutmann’s vision 
of society was profoundly hierarchical. In a 1935 article in the journal Africa, he wrote of the 
corrupting power of money, and the disasters caused by ‘the confusion, the levelling down, and even 
complete abandonment of all difference in social position due to birth’ which money inevitably 
caused.35 
Gutmann’s analysis and conclusions were not always shared by other missionaries and 
colonial officials. Charles Dundas, the British colonial official who similarly drew on Mtui’s research 
but reached very different conclusions, argued, in line with the thinking which characterized interwar 
approaches to colonial governance in Africa and the policy of indirect rule, that the clan had long 
since been superseded by the institution of chiefship. But Dundas did not think that matters could be 
left there: rather, his point was that it was this institution that should form the basis of political 
progress.36 
As Gutmann and Dundas’s writings suggest, the colonial officials and missionaries who 
worried about the impact of social change on society in the first half of the twentieth century were not 
simply seeking to repair and re-traditionalise social bonds that were being broken in order to 
conserve; they were seeking rather to manage what they themselves termed ‘progress’ in a way that 
did not break society apart.37 They were concerned with how to reconcile freedom with society and 
                                                     
34 Klaus Fiedler, Christianity and African Culture: conservative German Protestant missionaries in 
Tanzania, 1900–1940 (Leiden, 1996), pp. 42, 115. 
35 Bruno Gutmann, ‘The African Standpoint’, Africa (1935), 1–19, pp. 9–10. 
36 To see how the principles of indirect rule were explained by the government in Tanganyika, see for 
example: No author, ‘Namna nci inavyotawaliwa’, Mambo Leo, December 1925, p. 265. Charles 
Dundas and his political thinking is discussed at greater length in Hunter, ‘In pursuit of the ‘higher 
medievalism’. 
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were often, as I have suggested elsewhere, inspired by late nineteenth-century liberal thought.38 
Where they disagreed with each other was in their interpretations of the societies they encountered: on 
their past, their present and their potential futures, and on whether growing individualism was 
perceived as an essential part of social and political ‘progress’ or a threat to society.  
Gutmann’s concerns about society and social relationships, and his fears about the 
consequences of individualism, were certainly far from unique and seem to have tapped into and 
perhaps helped shape wider concerns in the region. We can trace similar anxieties through a wide 
array of written Swahili-language texts circulating at the time in the region, particularly in the 
Lutheran missionary periodical Ufalme wa Mungu and the periodical of the Kilimanjaro Native Co-
Operative Union, Uremi. In editorials, reports of church meetings and letters, we find a rich seam of 
discussion about society and social relationships, focusing in particular on the ways in which children 
were failing to obey their parents and were leaving the region to go to the coast in pursuit of work. As 
Ruben Moshi, a member of the Lutheran Church, complained in the pages of Ufalme wa Mungu in 
1930, the youth ‘like to dress in the European fashion, they wander about from place to place even as 
far as the coast and if they are prevented by their parents or church elders they do not listen’ and were 
even ‘arrogant towards them.’39 If the complaints voiced by people such as Moshi were often similar, 
the answers  that were proposed to the problems they identified varied. For Joseph Maliti, President of 
the local coffee co-operative, the answer lay in developing agriculture so that ‘we profit from our 
country and can thus bring back our children who are lost and poor, going to the coast with an 
emptiness in body and soul’. Progress required working together and cooperation.40   
At the same time, the pages of the Dar es Salaam newspaper Kwetu, colonial Tanganyika’s 
only independent African newspaper in the 1930s and 1940s, provided a forum for a vocal critique of 
Chagga chiefs who, it was said, were exceeding their powers and exacting too much from the 
population. The way forward was not however to strip chiefs of their authority, but to reinvigorate the 
traditions by which that authority had been controlled. By excluding wealthy elder men from a 
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39 Ruben Moshi, Ufalme wa Mungu, January 1930, p. 8. 
40 Joseph Maliti, ‘Letter from the President’, Uremi, June 1932, p. 3, TNA 20984. 
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political role, it was argued, a key check on chiefly authority had been lost. In the past, wrote one 
correspondent in the pages of Kwetu, the rich could protect the poor, but these days ‘any person who 
tries to help a person or two people with their problems, for example by lending money or 
slaughtering cows will find that people who try to help in this way are called agitators.’41  
This context helps us make sense of the ideas put forward by the Kilimanjaro Chagga 
Citizens Union, particularly in the 1950s. The Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union put forward a 
hierarchical model of society, in which full citizenship was limited to land-holding men, who were 
responsible for providing for their children and poorer kinsmen.42 They criticized chiefs as 
illegitimate, but when they called for a return of power to ‘the people’, their definition of ‘the people’ 
was a narrow one. Political rights were understood as being limited to land-holding males, and 
mediated through the Union itself.  
Like the writers of the 1920s and 1930s, the Union’s leader Petro Njau was concerned with 
the state of the moral order and were convinced that trust had broken down. He called for the 
authority of clan elders to be resurrected, identifying the impact of the declining authority of clan 
elders in the rising ‘price of bridewealth, lack of manners and respect’ and ‘dishonesty’ in relation to 
property.43 The cure would lie in clan elders reasserting their authority, and in all accepting the 
authority of the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union as a disciplinary body.44  
Njau claimed to be concerned with freedom, and so he was: but this was freedom only for 
those who held membership cards for his organization. Freedom came through membership of the 
Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union, which for Njau was equated with belonging to a Chagga political 
community. To cite the historian Sean Stilwell, writing about a very different context, this was a 
definition of freedom not as ‘the absence of obligations, dependence, or other ties that restrict or 
                                                     
41 Letter from S. M. Ngooly, ‘Uzembe katika mabaraza ya wenyeji wa utawala wa Moshi’, Kwetu, 8 
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narrow an individual’s right and ability to make decisions and act autonomously’, but rather ‘as the 
ability or right to belong.’45 Crucially, this was an understanding of freedom which was entirely 
compatible with inequality and social subordination. 
It is significant that Njau’s project was briefly successful. He and his party managed both to 
convince the colonial administration of the need for a paramount chief, despite the administration’s 
initial opposition, and to ensure that their candidate, Thomas Marealle, was elected.  But over the 
course of the 1950s, Njau’s increasingly conservative vision of society was challenged by a powerful 
alternative based on radical principles of social and political equality for men and women, young and 
old, and a rejection of social hierarchies. The District Commissioner’s response to Njau’s attempt to 
limit rights to those who held membership cards was to charge him with ‘complete ignorance of what 
democracy and freedom really mean’ and to insist that the Union ‘should also understand clearly that 
all Chagga have rights whether members of your ‘Union’ or not.’46 At the same time, the Union’s 
exclusion of women was challenged by opponents in the Chagga Congress who set themselves apart 
by welcoming women members.47 The demand of the paramount chief, Thomas Marealle, in 1955 
that Chagga students studying at Makerere College in Uganda apologise after they had been critical of 
him in an article in the Makerere College magazine, and that they do so in a mode deemed to be in 
accordance with Chagga customs and traditions, provoked opposition from a younger generation 
unwilling to accept a humiliating insistence on deference of the young towards the old.48  
Ultimately Njau’s opponents, first the Chagga Congress and then the Chagga Democratic 
Party, succeeded in arguing convincingly that there was no place in a democratizing Tanganyika for a 
paramount chief and that he should be replaced by an elected President of the Chagga. A central 
theme in the opposition to the paramount chief was a concern that the position was out of step with 
democratic principles, particularly if it was now to be understood as for life and hereditary. As Joseph 
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Merinyo wrote, ‘Many people would like there to be a vote every three years, especially these days. 
The people should be asked. The people are desperately waiting for the elections which will remove 
imperialism and bring democracy to Uchaggani.’49 Underlying this point was a conviction that 
political rights were the property of all. As one student, E. Alemyo, wrote in the pages of the 
Makerere College Chagga Students Magazine in 1959, God had not created some to rule and others to 
be ruled. All had a right and a duty to participate in Government through regular elections.50  
In the mid-twentieth-century, these arguments were increasingly powerful, both locally and at 
a global level, and benefited from the support of TANU, Tanganyika’s increasingly prominent 
nationalist movement committed to the same goals. Indeed, the Chagga Democratic Party and TANU 
were so closely linked as to be hard to distinguish. Eventually, a local referendum was held on 4 
February 1960.51 44 per cent of those eligible to vote voted, and of those voters, 22,000 voted for a 
President, while only 5,000 voted for a continuation of the Paramount Chief, bringing the Kilimanjaro 
Union’s project to an end.  
Yet though the two intellectual projects we have discussed here were very different, with one 
based on the principle of social and political equality and the other on a hierarchical vision of society, 
they shared common roots in early and mid-twentieth century thinking about progress, social change 
and society. Rather than casting one as ‘modern’ and the other as ‘traditional’, we might better see 
them as different wings of a broad spectrum of thought.  
In post-colonial Tanzania, TANU’s leader Julius Nyerere’s conception of socialism, while 
radically opposed to Njau’s thinking in that it was based on the principle of social equality, had its 
roots in a similar concern with how to reconcile progress with the maintaining and strengthening of 
social bonds.52 Locally, the concerns raised by the Kilimanjaro Union, particularly around 
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landlessness and gender and generational relations, did not disappear with their loss of local political 
power, but continued to be discussed in the pages of the local newspaper Kusare through the 1960s.53 
Understanding their ideas, based as they were in a rich tradition of thinking about community and 
society, and interrogating them alongside ultimately more powerful bodies of ideas in which freedom 
was bound up with equality, helps us better situate decolonizing Africa in a longer framework of 
African history, and it is to these broader implications that I turn now. 
 
 
III Conclusion 
 
By stepping outside nationalist frameworks of analysis, historians of decolonization have increasingly 
come to stress the possibilities open to political actors in the period after 1945. Although the final 
result was a continent of nation-states, historians have argued that it did not have to be this way. Yet 
while the recent flourishing of new histories of decolonization to which we owe this insight has been 
very welcome, in some ways it has simply moved the moment at which political futures became fixed 
to a slightly later date. The moment of possibility was short lived, and by 1960 it was increasingly 
clear that the territorial nation-state would dominate the immediate political future in Africa as 
elsewhere. The barriers to political federalism, perhaps the most widely talked about alternative to the 
nation-state, were too high.54 While a critique of nationalist frameworks of analysis has, therefore, 
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greatly enriched the historiography of decolonization, it may be that we now need to look elsewhere 
to take the historiography forward.  
Just as ‘methodological nationalism’ once shaped the way that decolonization was 
understood, so, I have argued, has a kind of ‘methodological liberalism’.  Removing the prism of mid-
twentieth-century liberalism reminds us that far from being always and necessarily constitutive of 
modernity, mid-twentieth-century liberalism was itself a distinctive ideology which responded to a 
distinctive moment. Provincialising this mode of thought opens up the possibility of exploring 
traditions of thinking which fit uncomfortably into that framework and rethinking what kinds of 
political possibilities were open in the era of decolonization. 
The political thinking of the period of decolonization was, as those who first analysed it 
recognized, centrally concerned with the concept of freedom. Yet while for some freedom was 
inseparable from equality, for others it was conceivable that freedom could coexist with inequality 
and the reconstitution or maintenance of social and political hierarchies. Some of these conceptions 
drew on liberal ideologies, particularly the liberal idealism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries which sought human flourishing through community, and could sit within a broadly defined 
liberal tradition. But others were incompatible with or directly challenged liberal ideologies. 
Exploring the ways freedom was thought about in its contemporary context means that we can take 
seriously the political thinking of those for whom freedom did not mean individual autonomy and did 
not presume social equality, as was the case for Petro Njau and the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens 
Union, who criticized chiefs while nevertheless seeking to defend the power of wealthy men and the 
authority of clan leaders. 
To acknowledge this has implications for the way we approach the history of decolonization 
in Africa, and what happened next. Focusing attention so heavily on those who argued for a conjoined 
package of ‘[i]ndividual self-realization, political order, social freedom, and equity’ has meant that the 
apparent rapid abandonment of these ideas after independence was a puzzle to be accounted for. It has 
usually been explained simply in terms of political necessity, as weak post-colonial states cracked 
down on perceived opponents in order to secure their position, employing colonial-era strategies of 
governance to do so.  
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But looking beyond the familiar, and putting the projects of the ‘ethnic patriots’ and 
‘conservatives’ of the 1950s in the same analytical frame as those of the nationalist parties, allows us 
to think more carefully about the intellectual context in which post-colonial governments and their 
citizens were operating and the intellectual resources upon which they were able to draw. It reminds 
us to pay attention to those traditions of thinking about society and social relationships which were as 
strong, in some times and places, as the alternative radical tradition of individual rights and social 
equality that enjoyed a brief hegemony in the late 1950s. By doing so, we might better understand the 
intellectual roots of the conservative projects of post-colonial leaders. At the same time, we may also 
be able better to identify the ways in which, even as political rights were rolled back and political 
space closed down in the years after independence, moral claims and political critiques continued to 
be made, as they had been in earlier periods, both in recognizable and in more unfamiliar and even 
uncomfortable idioms.55  
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